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Current data privacy-preservation models lack the ability to aid data decision makers in
processing datasets for publication. The proposed algorithm allows data processors to
simply provide a dataset and state their criteria to recommend an xk-anonymity approach.
Additionally, the algorithm can be tailored to a preference and gives the precision range
and maximum data loss associated with the recommended approach. This dissertation
report outlined the research’s goal, what barriers were overcome, and the limitations of
the work’s scope. It highlighted the results from each experiment conducted and how it
influenced the creation of the end adaptable algorithm. The xk-anonymity model built
upon two foundational privacy models, the k-anonymity and l-diversity models. Overall,
this study had many takeaways on data and its power in a dataset.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Background/Introduction
Privacy-preservation approaches hinder the quantity of data available for
publication (Brown, 2017). In order for a successfully designed privacy-preservation
method, the model must incorporate many key factors. First, a model needed to
understand the types of attributes in a dataset as it is critical when looking to preserve
information privacy. Second, a model needed to understand the necessary anonymization
techniques to preserve privacy. Third, a model needed to harmonize the anonymization
techniques used on the attributes for a successful de-identified dataset. By building upon
foundational privacy models' approaches (Yang, Li, Zhang, & Yu, 2013), a strong
platform was created for future improved methods.
There are four commonly accepted categories of attributes: explicit, quasiidentifier, sensitive, and non-sensitive (Nagendrakumar, Aparna, & Ramesh, 2014). An
attribute is explicit if it directly identifies an individual, such as social security number.
Quasi-identifiers are frequently published attributes that could detect a person’s sensitive
information if the data-mined together with other published datasets. Common quasiidentifiers are zip codes and year of birth (YOB). Classified as sensitive attributes, these
values include details that are particular to a person but also share the same value with
other people. For example, health conditions and salaries are sensitive attributes. When
attributes do not apply to the other three categories, they are non-sensitive. By properly
classifying the attributes, data processors can successfully transform their datasets with a
privacy-preserving model.
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Throughout all research on privacy-preservation models, alterations were
required. Anonymization techniques apply modifications to a dataset for publication
eligibility. Two common anonymization techniques, generalization and suppression, are
published in several relevant models (Sweeney, 2002b; Machanavajjhala, Kifer, Gehrke,
& Venkatasubramanian, 2007; Liu, Luo, & Huang, 2011; Angiuli & Waldo, 2016;
Brown, 2017). Other techniques used for anonymization include bucketization, data
falsification, and synthesizing datasets (Li, Li, Zhang, & Molloy, 2012; Brown, 2017;
Dwork, 2009). Modifications of datasets hinder information precision and can change
attributes’ relationships to one another (Angiuli & Waldo, 2016). A strong privacy model
needed to balance anonymization techniques to maintain a high precision and attribute
correlation.
There are four commonly accepted privacy-preservation methods. Sweeney
(2002a) created the k-anonymity privacy protection model to de-identify an individual
from its record. The k-anonymity theory stated a record is anonymous if there are at least
k-1 records matching the same criteria. The l-diversity model expanded on k-anonymity,
requiring there be at least l-diverse group of sensitive values for records to be
unidentifiable (Machanavajjhala et al., 2007). The t-closeness model addressed
weaknesses from k-anonymity and l-diversity where the total population had to be in a
specific range for a record to be published (Li, Li, & Venkatasubramanian, 2007).
Differential privacy model took a statistical approach to anonymize a dataset (Dwork,
McSherry, Nissim, & Smith, 2006). These four models provided future researchers a
foundation upon which to build a secure privacy model that meets at least these minimum
standards.
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To create a quality privacy-preservation model, a model needed to account for a
series of critical elements. It was crucial to classify attributes correctly in the dataset for
accurate processing. Data decision makers should understand how the application of
anonymization techniques affect the dataset for publication. Organizations have to set
guidelines based on privacy-preservation models for effective anonymization of their
datasets. Attribute classification, anonymization techniques, and de-identification models
are all key elements to maintain successful modification of dataset’s information for
privacy-preservation.
Problem Statement
There were no adaptable privacy-preservation methods available to handle diverse
datasets. Past failures with organizations protecting sensitive data, like Netflix’s
anonymized dataset failure (InfoLawGroup, 2013), demonstrated the need for an
adaptable tool to apply k-anonymity and l-diversity requirements to de-identify a dataset.
In order to modify personal information appropriately, for publication, quasi-identifiers
and sensitive attributes must be reviewed (Yang et al., 2013). As the quantity of quasiidentifiers increased, the loss in data exponentially increased, but Yang et al. (2013) did
not propose a way to handle the quasi-identifier variety to reduce data loss. Sensitive
attributes require l-diversity, so quasi-identifier pairs do not have a single sensitive value
that would result in directly identifying personal information (Machanavajjhala et al.,
2007). The l-diversity model tightened the requirements for records to pass for
publication, but the model negatively affected the quantity of publishable data. The 1/2k
theory aided in publishing higher quantity of data (Brown, 2017); however, research
limitations only measured a single fraction and did not measure precision rate.
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Organizations see the accumulating need for anonymization techniques when working
with datasets containing personal information (Garfinkel, 2015). No previous research
adjusted the k fraction for quasi-identifiers and reviewed sensitive attribute suppression.
This research study proposed an adaptable solution to privacy-preservation.
Dissertation Goal
The object of any privacy model is to design a method that is effective without
decreasing security (Aggarwal & Yu, 2008). The goal of this dissertation research was to
create an algorithm flexible to handle different quantities of quasi-identifiers.
Additionally, it analyzed a single sensitive value to understand the impact a diversity
requirement has on the overall publishable data rate. The model reviewed a dataset’s
composition to determine the best combination of anonymization techniques to maintain
precision and attribute correlations. The study investigated four privacy-preservation
aspects of data processing: the impact on the number of different quasi-identifiers in a
dataset, the set condition of l for l-diversity on a sensitive attribute, the difference in the
quasi-identifier pair values have on the overall dataset, and the rate of precision in a
dataset at different fractions of k. This work accomplished finding the appropriate k
fraction to process a dataset to meet k-anonymity and l-diversity with a certain degree of
precision. To measure success in this research, the algorithm can take a dataset of diverse
sizes and complete the lowest required modifications on the records to publish a dataset
that has a set precision range. The user is only required to provide three details: the
dataset, the quasi-identifier (which attributes), and the sensitive value (which single
attribute and the diversity value). For example, a user having a 500,000 record dataset,
with five quasi-identifiers, and a single sensitive attribute with a diversity of three can
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have the algorithm calculate those user details to determine the best approach to
anonymize the dataset. The model predicts the precision range and the best corresponding
fraction of k. The end algorithm provided all elements of a strong privacy model to
ensure it protects sensitive information, maintains similar features to the original dataset,
and preserves the correlation between attributes for data-mining (Gkoulalas-Divanis &
Verykios, 2009). The research proposed a better solution than previous models in
versatility for processing diverse dataset sizes and analyzing the significance of a quasiidentifier pair.
Research Questions
The goal of this research required the production of an algorithm to handle a
combination of different quasi-identifiers, a single sensitive value at diverse levels, and a
variety of dataset sizes. Research questions focused on the different aspects of the study,
which aided in the creation of the adaptable algorithm. Each research question addressed
at least one of the studied aspects for privacy-preservation.
•

Can a single quasi-identifier affect the precision rate of the overall publishable
dataset by more than 2%?

•

What impact does different size datasets have on precision rate?

•

Does processing a dataset with a lower fraction level of k improve the precision
rate?

•

What affects can different quantities of quasi-identifiers have on a dataset of the
same size?

•

How does l-diversity value affect the overall record publication quantity in a
single dataset?

5

Relevance and Significance
There were two primary reasons this research held relevance and significance.
The first significant component was organizations’ legal obligations to protect a person’s
identity (Angiuli & Waldo, 2016). The second component was the need for data in the
research environment to develop and improve society (Armer, 1981; Leonard, 2016;
Polonetsky & Tene, 2013; van der Sloot & van Schendel, 2016). Data processors legal
obligations and researchers’ information needs provided two significant and relevant
reasons to have this research conducted.
In 1974, the government realized the potential misuse of technology, which
exposed privacy issues to society. In response, the government created the Privacy Act of
1974 to protect information privacy (Smith, Dinev, & Xu, 2011). To complicate matters,
laws between countries hold privacy at different regulations (Schwartz, 2013). Even
within the United States (U.S.), different states have different standards on the
requirements for organizations to maintain personal data on a state’s resident. For
example, California requires a level of security protocols for organizations to implement
if they possess Californian residents’ information. These legal discrepancies and
requirements give a prime reason on why it is relevant and significant to create an
algorithm that is adaptable to organizations.
Other researchers and society benefit from a larger, more accurate, anonymized
dataset. Currently, alternative models, shown in literature review, attempt to modify
datasets for publications but lose valuable content that would remain in an adaptable
model. This conducted research aimed to improve on society’s ability to learn more
information by publishing higher quantities of quality data. It was relevant and significant
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for this research to be done as data-mining is a key part in discovering new knowledge
(Brown, 2017).
Barriers and Issues
The research overcame three main barriers and issues. The first barrier was the
contrasting goals between privacy and utility (Sedayao, Bhardwaj, & Gorade, 2014).
When increasing privacy in a dataset, the utility of the data decreases. Conflicts in
privacy and utility is an ongoing cause of problems between data publication value and
an individual’s right to privacy (Armer, 1981). In Privacy: A Survey, Armer (1981) used
the struggle of a person’s privacy versus society’s right to learn. The study showed the
need for more information to learn how to advance in society, but it came at a cost to an
individual’s privacy. This maintained a barrier with the growing usage of Big Data (Tene
& Polonetsky, 2013). Big Data is powering innovation, but it comes at a cost to
individuals’ privacy. Data are more necessary than ever before in society (Bertino, 2016);
the balance of utility and privacy is difficult to maintain. To solve this barrier, the model
educates users on how much precision and data loss the algorithm anticipates when
processing a dataset at a certain criterion.
Jurisdictional obligations set a minimum standard for organizations to process data
(Sedayao et al., 2014). The European Union (E.U.) implemented comprehensive
regulations to set a standard on all data; whereas, the U.S. adopted a sectoral approach.
This approach requires handling certain attributes differently depending on the industry
dispensing the information (Munir, Yasin, & Muhammad-Sukki, 2015). In the U.S. there
are the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) which require organizations to remove
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identifiable information before making a dataset publicly available (Angiuli & Waldo,
2016). How HIPAA processes attributes are different from how FERPA requires the data
to be processed. To remove this obstacle, the proposed algorithm recommended an
approach that met all requirements of k-anonymity and l-diversity to ensure deidentification of a record. The algorithm also is flexible in handling diverse requirements
so HIPAA and FERPA principles are eligible for processing.
The third issue this research addressed is the adaptability dilemma of current privacypreservation models. Yang et al. (2013) researched when implementing different quasiidentifiers, the data loss increased. To conquer this issue, the study encompassed many
datasets with different amounts of quasi-identifiers. This research overcame the
adaptability barrier by creating a model that handles a variety of attribute types, quasiidentifier pairs, and the diversity requirements of a sensitive value.
Assumptions and Limitations
As in many research projects, there were assumptions and limitations that were
taken into account. In this study, it assumed the data processed for anonymization was in
a structured format and the data processors have knowledge of what classification applies
to each attribute for proper processing. This research limited the review of quasiidentifiers to be at a maximum of five. The k value applied to the study remained constant
at five. This value is higher than the U.S. Department of Education's requirements and
based off previous research that used the numerical value of five (Angiuli & Waldo,
2016; Brown, 2017). The study limited a dataset to have only up to one sensitive
attribute, processed with three different potential diversity values (2, 3, or 4). Data
processors are required to rank their quasi-identifiers in order of importance and
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understand the change in utility if including cell-based suppression or sensitive
suppression. These assumptions and limitations allowed the research to focus on a set of
parameters.
Research Takeaways
In conducting this research, there are several takeaways learned about datasets.
This study explored the relationship between quasi-identifier pairs and the overall total
dataset. It found the precision change when using different fractions of k to create false
records. This research addressed how to compensate for Yang’s et al. (2013) research
findings, which showed the exponential data loss when there is an increase in quasiidentifiers. It discovered how to best approach the inclusion of a sensitive value. Overall,
the study learned more about the core features in a dataset. It learned the variation in
publication eligibility depending on the fraction, the amount of quasi-identifiers, the
dataset size, and the sensitive value diversity. This research confidently took away
several important details on how the classification of attributes affect the end
anonymization of a dataset.
The study’s proposed algorithm looked at many elements in a dataset for
anonymization. It required two pieces of information on top of the dataset itself: the
number of quasi-identifiers and the diversity value, if applicable. In cases where the
datasets included a sensitive value the processor could opt-in to include the
anonymization technique sensitive suppression. This allowed the research to be more
versatile for users input on anonymization techniques depending on the dataset's need. In
addition, the experiments showed the impact one anonymization technique has when it is
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and is not applied to the process. The end-result created an adaptable algorithm that
enables decision makers to process their dataset that best suits their needs.
Even if the proposed algorithm is not widely used, the study discovered a lot of
quality information. First, the research illustrated the impact a single cell has on an
overall dataset. It reviewed the effects attributes classified as a quasi-identifier or
sensitive have on a dataset. The research learned the influence of quasi-identifier pairs
and a sensitive value diversity when comparing the original dataset and the postprocessed dataset. Expanding on the 1/2k fraction resulted in a better understanding of
the power different fractions have on a dataset’s publication ability. This research is full
of quality discoveries in addition to the end proposed adaptable algorithm. The study
produced a detailed investigation on data and its sway on a dataset.
Definition of Terms
Attribute Disclosure

New knowledge associated with a record is discovered based on
the published attributes (Li et al., 2007)

Background Attack

Attackers knows quasi-identifier(s) value(s) to deduce who is
associated to record (Li et al., 2007)

Cell-Based Suppression

For the purpose of this study, cell-based suppression is defined
as the quasi-identifier (from ranking order) elected for
suppression

Counterfactual Reasoning Determination that new information will be discovered about a
person independent of the dataset being published or not
(Machanavajjhala et al., 2015)
Differential privacy

Anonymization model that produces synthetic datasets from the
original dataset (Dwork & Roth, 2009)

Explicit Attributes

Directly identifiable information on an individual
(Nagendrakumar et al., 2014)
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Generalization

For the purpose of this study, generalization is a cell modified
from a specific value to a broader category range of values

Homogeneity Attack

Sensitive information exposed based on all similar records
having the same value (Machanavajjhala et al., 2007)

Identity Disclosure

Associated person is identified to the record (Li et al., 2007)

Inferential Disclosure

New information discovered with extreme assurance through
statistical findings on a record (Ciriani, Vimercati, Foresti, and
Samarati, 2007)

k-anonymity

Anonymization model to require at least k amount of similar
records in a dataset for a record to be eligible for publication
(Sweeney, 2002a)

l-diversity

Anonymization model to require there be at least l amount of
other sensitive value options in the k record pairs
(Machanavajjhala et al., 2007)

Linkage Attack

Discovers new information about a person through the
connection of attributes in multiple datasets (Dwork & Roth,
2014)

Noise

For the purpose of this study, noise is false data that are added to
a dataset

Precision

For the purpose of this study, precision is the number of original
cells divided by the total amount of end cells.

Quasi-identifiers

Commonly published attributes (Nagendrakumar et al., 2014)

Quasi-identifier pair

For the purpose of this study, quasi-identifier pair is all quasiidentifiers in a record linked together

Sensitive Attributes

Values that are special and/or delicate to an individual
(Nagendrakumar et al., 2014)

Sensitive Suppression

For the purpose of this study, sensitive suppression is sensitive
attribute eligible for suppression if l requirement is not fulfilled

Simulatability Approach

Ability to make the statistical dataset indistinguishable from the
original dataset (Machanavajjhala et al., 2015)

Suppression

For the purpose of this study, suppression is the removal of a cell
or record’s content

11

Synthetic Data

Statistical data that are comparable to the original data
(Garfinkel, 2015)

xk-anonymity

For the purpose of this study, xk-anonymity is anonymization
model where a fraction(x) of k will determine the minimum
amount of records in a pair required to allow for noise to be
added, anything under the xk will be suppressed

1/2k theory

Anonymization model that requires there be at least 1/2k amount
of records in a pair for noise to be added (Brown, 2017)

List of Acronyms
E.U.

European Union

FERPA

Family Education Rights and Privacy Act

GDPR

General Data Protection Regulation

HIPAA

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act

Summary
Chapter 1 provided an overview of the research project. It gave a brief definition
of some commonly accepted privacy-preservation models, data classifications, and
anonymization techniques. The problem facing privacy-preservation today is there are no
published models available to account the necessary fraction of k to balance the
modification of a dataset. The research questions and goals followed to address how the
study planned to solve the problem. Within the chapter, it detailed the significance and
relevance for conducting this research, and what barriers it overcame. The research
introduction provided assumptions, limitations, and research takeaways. Finally, the
chapter ends by providing a list of key terms, definitions, and acronyms used throughout
the paper.
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Chapter 2
Review of Literature
Data availability has improved society; however, people worry about how
information is used (van der Aalst, Blichler, & Heinzl, 2017). Information privacy dates
back to 1945 (Smith et al., 2011). During that time, society had limited technology; most
of the information collected was from the government and some businesses. Starting in
1961, an increased risk in information privacy disclosures began in the social, political,
and legal arenas. By 1980, networked computer systems were able to hold more data than
ever before, resulting in the 1984 Privacy Protection Act. In the U.S. today, the majority
of systems have transitioned over to data systems connected to the entire world,
exponentially increasing privacy concerns. Data-mining technologies enable the
discovery of new insights; however, they pose a threat to privacy in today’s global
society (Thuraisingham, 2015).
Struggles rise as the goal of data usage conflicts with the privacy protection
requirements (Garfinkel, 2015). Data are changing how people conduct business,
research, socialize, and govern society (van der Aalst et al., 2017). According to Yaseen,
Abbas, Anjum, Saba, Malik, ... and Bashir (2018), “Data publishing is obligatory for
analysts” (p. 27156). Industries also benefit from the acquisition, sale, and analytical
review of data (Garfinkel, 2015). To protect individuals’ personal information, data must
be pre-processed before publication (Bindahman, Arshad, & Zakaria, 2017).
Personal data are deemed de-identified when information can no longer identify
or link an individual to the record (OAIC, 2014). Removing the identity of a person from
the record is “technically and legally” complicated and requires special treatment across
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different industries (Leichty & Leong, 2015, p.1). To de-identify records, all explicit
attributes first must be masked or eliminated. Records are then reviewed for potential
linkage by non-explicit attributes that could leave an individual vulnerable. Once data
decision makers meet the specific requirements for their industry and affiliated countries,
the process of de-identification is complete.
There are two usages for privacy-preservation: publication and data-mining
(Garfinkel, 2015). Privacy-preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) creates synthetic data or
de-identifies a dataset’s personal information to satisfy publication requirements. PPDP
completes a series of tasks to protect an individual’s privacy (Rahmani, Amine, &
Hamou, 2015). Privacy-preserving Data-mining (PPDM) is a type of data-mining that
seeks to protect sensitive data while still accomplishing the data-mining goal
(Chidambaram & Srinivasagan, 2014). In both cases, personal data is at risk of explicit
information being exposed, which, in return, demands data protection.
The information gained from the data analyzers needs to measure the overall
privacy risk (Li et al., 2007). The difference between the pre-processed dataset and postprocessed dataset equals the information gained. The post-processed data should be
valuable to learn new information about an entire population; however, it should not
expose something unique to one individual record. Privacy rights today allow for overall
new information to be discovered from a dataset, but any aspect of an individual’s
identity needs to be anonymized (Machanavajjhala & Kifer, 2015). Privacy-preservation
data models’ goals are to protect the individual and allow new information to be gained
from a dataset.
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Foundational Models
Data decision makers face challenges in releasing information without negotiating
privacy; without data publication, the demand for data itself could decrease (Sweeney,
2002a). When data-mining two publicly available datasets, Sweeney (2000) discovered
private information about an individual through common attributes the datasets shared.
Further research found even if k-anonymity was fulfilled delicate information could
expose an individual’s identity, requiring a need to add a diversity requirement to the
sensitive attributes (Machanavajjhala et al., 2007). Goswami and Madan’s (2017)
privacy-preservation model review included the four foundational methods to help future
researchers build upon.
k-anonymity
Sweeney (2000) used zip code, birthdate, and gender to link medical data,
provided by the Group Insurance Commission and Cambridge Massachusetts voters’
registration list to expose the medical records of the governor of Massachusetts. This
invasion of privacy to an individual illustrated a major weakness in regulations.
Organizations were able to publicize data without concern on how other published
datasets could allow data mining to discover an identity and sensitive information about a
person. To address this issue, Sweeney (2002a) proposed k-anonymity to require a
minimum amount of k records contain the same set of quasi-identifiers. By implementing
this standard, the governor’s medical history would have been protected because, in order
for an organization to publish his record, at least k number of records would have had the
same zip code, birthdate, and gender. This data processing requirement enhanced the
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privacy of individuals and gave stricter guidelines to organizations before publishing
records.
l-diversity
The proposal of the l-diversity model addressed weaknesses in k-anonymity
(Machanavajjhala et al., 2007). The l-diversity model is one of the most commonly
developed models in privacy-preservation (Liu et al., 2011). The k-anonymity set a
standard on how many records were required to have the same quasi-identifier set, but the
model did not address the commonality of sensitive attributes (Machanavajjhala et al.,
2007). Researchers found even if the dataset was k anonymized if all the sensitive values
in those records were the same, then private information of an individual would be
exposed. To illustrate this, if k=3, the quasi-identifier set was zip code, birthdate, and
gender, and the sensitive attribute was diagnosis, then three records matching zip code=
06010, birthdate= 01/01/1970, and gender= male would meet the k-anonymity
requirement to be published. However, if all three of those records had a sensitive value
for cancer, then it would not matter who the specific individual was to each record.
Someone matching the quasi-identifier set would have their privacy invaded by
discovering they have cancer. To solve this invasion of privacy, researchers added the ldiversity model to the k-anonymity model requirement to diversify the records by
including at least l many sensitive values, which eliminated a weakness to k-anonymity.
t-closeness
Limitations of l-diversity enabled researchers to propose t-closeness (Li et al.,
2007). The researchers’ theory measured the privacy of an individual by the information
gained, the difference between post-belief and prior-belief based on the information
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published in the dataset. This model required the distribution of sensitive attributes to be
t-close to the overall distance of the table. The t-closeness model differs from l-diversity
by limiting the difference between two records in the k record set. Researchers used the
Earth Mover Distance metric to calculate the distance between sensitive values. They
developed a hierarchy tree distribution to measure categorical sensitive values. Their goal
was to have information learned from the overall table without contributing to the
information gained about an individual record.
Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a statistical approach to de-identify an individual by
determining the probability of information being reported if an individual is or is not a
part of the dataset (Dwork, 2009). Researchers’ attention focused on preventing new risks
to a person. Their theory believed an individual could be harmed by the knowledge
produced by the dataset, but they would be harmed no matter if they were in the dataset
or not (Dwork, 2016). The goal was to create a dataset with high statistical accuracy to
the overall original data with a low risk of identifying an individual, minimizing the
sensitivity of the published dataset. Adding minimal false information, otherwise referred
to as noise, would enable a dataset to have low sensitivity (Dwork et al., 2006). In
Dwork’s (2016) discussion on differential privacy, the privacy model approach separates
learning information about the dataset and the knowledge gained from the particular
characteristics about an individual. The researcher noted that judgment calls were needed
if attributes could be used to violate the privacy of people. Dwork (2016) produced
positive results using differential privacy by studying synthetic datasets. These types of
datasets are similar to the original dataset but kept an individual’s privacy secure. Years
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of research on differential privacy has been conducted to use statistical analysis to create
synthetic datasets that protect identities while gaining new information.
Proposed Models
The k-anonymity, l-diversity, t-closeness, and differential privacy models are
some of the commonly accepted privacy models in protecting a person’s identity (Sei,
Okumura, Takenouchi, & Ohsuga, 2017). Other models have been proposed using those
models as baseline to improve data de-identification. The t-closeness model had
improvements suggested by the original group of researchers that proposed the tcloseness model (Li, Li, & Venkatasubramanian, 2010). To allow for more utility in a
published dataset, slicing was proposed to address restrictions from foundational models
(Li et al., 2012). In conjunction with k-anonymity, clustering algorithms were used to
remove the identification of an individual (Canbay & Sever, 2015 & Bindahman et al.,
2017). Brown (2017) took k-anonymity requirements and applied a balance of noise and
suppression to increase the records ability of publication. Various methods attempted to
improve anonymizing datasets.
(n,t)-closeness
Researchers that proposed the t-closeness model found a better utility and privacy
compromise when further breaking down the dataset, proposing a new closeness model,
(n,t)-closeness (Li et al., 2010). The t-closeness model limited the release of valuable
information depending on the overall population distance scale originally proposed. They
found that breaking down the overall dataset into subpopulations could produce larger
overall likelihood of publication. If there were at least n records to a population set that
was at least t close to one another, then it would be a “natural superset” (Li et al., 2010,
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p.5) and would be valid for publication. Natural superset means there are multiple sets of
populations in one dataset. Independently, each population set meets the t-closeness
criteria. To demonstrate where (n, t)-closeness = (1000, .1), if there were a 1000 records
that held the zip code 061** and 2500 records that were 067** both sets would be valid
for publication as long as among their sets individually t-closeness would not be higher
than .1. In the original t-closeness proposal, if 061** did not meet the .1 set, by the rest of
the population then the records were suppressed. This additional feature allowed for the
release of more information about populations.
Slicing
The slicing approach improved on the restrictions that k-anonymity and l-diversity
approaches did not address (Li et al., 2012). The k-anonymity method loses a substantial
amount of data and l-diversity publishes quasi-identifiers where it is easy for attackers to
re-identify individuals. To improve on these weaknesses, a new method focused on
keeping highly correlated attributes together for research analysis. Slicing partitioned the
dataset vertically and horizontally. To complete a vertical partition, the dataset would
have attributes broken up into groups based on their correlation capabilities. Then, the
dataset would be separated horizontally to create buckets. The buckets would randomly
be re-organized so the two columns could not link an individual to the record. This model
allowed no generalization to be completed and maintained a set l-diversity criterion. The
research’s example had eight records that contained three quasi-identifiers and one
sensitive attribute: age, sex, zip code, and disease. First, age and sex were separated from
zip code and disease. Next, the eight records got divided into two groups of four. After
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slicing the dataset, the detail groups were randomly re-sorted to allow the original raw
data to be kept with minor re-organization, preserving the data value and utility.
Clustering
Clustering techniques were used in combination with k-anonymity to improve
data privacy and decrease disclosure risks (Canbay & Sever, 2015; Bindahman et al.,
2017). Researchers found that limiting the data processing by k-anonymity resulted in
less diverse data, but there were more lost data when only clustering information (Canbay
& Sever, 2015). To build a stronger model, they combined the two techniques to create a
3-anonymized dataset. This approach used the Self-Organizing Maps algorithm to cluster
the records. Canbay and Sever (2015) found when clustering the dataset more diverse
groups of information would be available to process for anonymization. This increased
the diversity and decreased the data loss. Bindahman et al. (2017) presented the S-Cluster
approach to progress on data utility and privacy. This model wanted to eliminate gender
and age disclosure risk. By processing the dataset with the S-Cluster, the researchers
were able to improve the quality of published data. Both clustering techniques worked to
diversify and enhance data utility (Canbay & Sever, 2015; Bindahman et al., 2017).
1/2k Theory
Research was conducted to build on k-anonymity, introducing 1/2k theory
(Brown, 2017). The concept of 1/2k theory defined if the quasi-identifier pair had at least
1/2 the amount of k records required, it was more beneficial to create false records than
removing the original records (Brown, 2017). This research compared a dataset being
processed with 1/2k and k-anonymity. Of the four experiments completed, when the
dataset was processed with 1/2k theory, less record suppression was done, with better
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total original record count, and higher quasi-identifier pairs, providing a more diverse
dataset. In the first experiment alone, there were major differences between using
traditional k-anonymity approach and the proposed 1/2k approach. The 1/2k approach
resulted in 4,761 more original records eligible for publication by only adding 2,284 false
records. Between the two approaches there was over 7% difference of original records
eligible for publication when implementing the 1/2k theory. This research introduced a
fraction of k could increase the publication capability of a dataset.
Attribute Classification in Models
Attribute classification is critically important to privacy-preserving models. A
study found that 87% of people in the U.S. could be identified solely on three quasiidentifiers: birthdate, gender, and zip code (Sweeney, 2000). The k-anonymity method
used quasi-identifiers to help propose protection in re-identify records, like the governor
of Massachusetts (Sweeney, 2002a). The l-diversity model illustrated how it was not
sufficient to incorporate only quasi-identifiers to protect datasets, but to include a
required diverse amount of sensitive attributes (Machanavajjhala et al., 2007). Based on
the privacy-preserving models available today, all models illustrated the significance of
attributes classification to protect privacy.
On top of the standard four classifications of attributes, researchers built a new
classification to accommodate another perspective of possible attribute grouping. Shi,
Xiong, and Fung (2010) proposed an additional category called quasi-sensitive attributes.
These attributes would not necessarily be appropriate to categorize as sensitive on their
own but when congregated with other known information could expose an individual.
Their example used the attribute symptoms. This attribute alone would not be sensitive;
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however, when linking the symptoms to a sensitive attribute like disease, there is a
potential privacy breach. This additional category enables another option for a data
processer to identify their attributes.
Attribute classification was highly reliant in Brown’s (2017) research on a data
privacy model for correlational research. The research examined quasi-identifiers and the
effects in using them as a growing pair set. In the study, it was more efficient to introduce
the quasi-identifiers gradually than to group them as a whole and process the dataset
once. To demonstrate this, it would be better first to process two quasi-identifiers and
then continuously re-process the pair by adding another quasi-identifier until all quasiidentifiers were included. Furthermore, the research found that creating a ranking system
to quasi-identifiers influenced the overall number of records eligible for publication. This
research changed the order of processing between YOB and gender. As a result, when the
approach processed gender before YOB more original unmodified records, more total
records, and more quasi-identifier unique pairs were publishable. Brown (2017)
highlighted how attribute priority and gradual grouping of quasi-identifiers increase
publication.
Anonymization Techniques
Privacy-preservation models use anonymization techniques to de-identify records.
The two most common techniques include the use of generalization and suppression of
data. Generalization modifies a cell from a specific value to a broad range of values
(Nagendrakumar et al., 2014). This technique is the basis of l-diversity and t-closeness
(Sei et al., 2017). Data warehousing, data-mining, and machine learning all use the
generalization technique (Yaseen et al., 2018). Generalization itself has different
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approaches. Some researchers used generalization hierarchies to determine the best fit for
an attributes’ value (Sweeney, 2002b; Yaseen et al., 2018). Other proposed research
approaches generalized quasi-identifiers at a single level grouping (Brown, 2017) and
fluctuated the generalization range to make the original data eligible for publication
(Angiuli & Waldo, 2016). Overall, several studies included the generalization technique
when completing anonymization.
Suppression removes content from the dataset that does not meet anonymization
requirements. Some models used the addition of noise to mask the true identity of a
record (Sei et al., 2017; Angiuli & Waldo, 2016; Brown, 2017). Sweeney (2002b) used
suppression technique in the k-anonymity model to protect individual’s information when
they were easy to identify. Additionally, Sweeney (2002b) suppressed part of an
attribute’s value to increate record privacy. Brown (2017) approached suppression
differently by suppressing records that were under 1/2k. Throughout numerous studies,
there were some kind of suppression incorporated. Using generalization and suppression
in excessive quantities decreases the data usability (Nagendrakumar et al., 2014);
however, there are other anonymization techniques used to help maintain data utility.
Other anonymization techniques include data falsification, synthesizing, and
bucketization (Angiuli & Waldo, 2016; Brown, 2017; Dwork, 2009; Li et al., 2012). Data
falsification approaches minimize a dataset’s loss of records to suppression by adding
false records (Angiuli & Waldo, 2016; Brown, 2017). Some models proposed creating
synthetic data to make a comparable dataset to the original (Dwork, 2009). Synthesizing
dataset is different as it replaces the original records with statistically proportional
information for publication. Bucketization maintains all original records, but horizontally
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and vertically re-organizes the data set to preserve high correlation between attributes (Li
et al., 2012). Proven as viable option, generalization, suppression, falsification,
bucketization, and synthetization are suitable anonymization techniques to de-identify
datasets for publication.
Angiuli and Waldo (2016) examined how generalization technique could fulfill kanonymity in their research to publish a larger dataset. Instead of traditional grouping for
generalization, they proposed a new “greedy algorithm” (Angiuli & Waldo, 2016, p.592).
This algorithm reviewed how many additional records would be required to meet k and
paired the record(s) with the closest value to achieve k-anonymity requirements. Records
that already met k were not affected in the example they provided. This proposed
technique enabled more records to be kept for publication. The second element in their
research was instead of suppressing any records they added fake records to bring the
record count to acceptable k minimum requirements. Their results found that applying the
greedy algorithm increased publication ability; however, the noise correlation was
negatively impacted.
Follow-up research was done on Angiuli and Waldo’s (2016) research to balance
out suppression and data falsification with 1/2k theory (Brown, 2017). This study kept
traditional single layered generalization by grouping YOB in five-year increments.
Instead of adding noise to all records to remove suppression, the research looked to
negotiate suppression by reviewing if there were at least half the records of k. If the
records qualified as 1/2k then the records would apply noise. This would avoid
suppression and benefit the end original records count. The example applied in the
research had k=5, so if there were at least three records in the dataset matching the quasi-
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identifier pair, false records were added to the dataset. If there were one or two records
then the record(s) were suppressed. Brown’s (2017) approach adjusted traditional
suppression technique to benefit publishing more of the original content.
False and Synthetic Data
Datasets that add noise or change to synthetic datasets for privacy-preservation
have adverse effects. One proposed model chose to remove suppression by adding false
records to meet k-anonymity (Angiuli & Waldo, 2016). The research discovered,
however, there was a negative impact on correlating attributes. Noise is a perturbation
technique (Agrawal & Srikant, 2000). False record creation enables more original content
to be published (Brown, 2017), but it hinders the precision of the dataset. A balance must
be made to compromise on additional noise and record suppression.
Synthetic data created from a statistical representation of the original data content
(Fung, Wang, Chen, & Yu, 2010). The dataset additionally could be partially or fully
synthetic (Dreschsler, Bender, & Rässler, 2008). Partially synthesized datasets hold more
utility, but the disclosure risk increases. Information confidence issues in modified
datasets empowered fully synthesized datasets (Rubin, 1993). These types of datasets are
not practical in some research scenarios as they do meet “truthfulness at the record level”
(Fung et al., 2010, p.4). Even though differential privacy, a fundamental model, is a valid
option for privacy-preservation, the restrictions on a dataset impedes the usability of the
published dataset.
Security Issues
Data-mining threatens privacy (Aggarwal & Yu, 2008). Li et al. (2007) broke
down two ways information could be disclosed from privacy-preservation models,

25

identity or attribute based. Moreover, there are three main disclosures risks (Li et al.,
2007; Ciriani et al., 2007). Identity disclosure could happen when a record is published
and an individual is re-identified to that record (Li et al., 2007). Attribute disclosure
could happen when there is information gained from an individual based on an attribute
being published. Connecting quasi-sensitive attributes along with known knowledge
could result in an indirect disclosure of information (Shi et al., 2010). In an identity
disclosure event an attribute disclosure could proceed; however, if there is an attribute
disclosure there is not necessary an identity disclosure. Inferential disclosure threat was
an additional disclosure type released by Ciriani et al. (2007). This disclosure type is a
serious invasion of people’s privacy because attackers are able, with high confidence, use
statistics to discover a person’s identity. Individuals have the right to control the personal
information they release (Tene & Polonetsky, 2013). If datasets are published that reveal
any personal details of an individual then their privacy has been violated.
As studies evolved, attacks on privacy have affected identity preservation causing
newly proposed models to be formed. There were three attacks addressed based on two of
the fundamental privacy models. Sweeney’s (2002a) k-anonymity model looked to
protect individuals from linkage attack. This attack occurred when two datasets were
combined to learn new information about a person. Machanavajjhala et al. (2007) found
weaknesses in k-anonymity that could result in homogeneity and background knowledge
attack. Homogeneity attacks are the result of all records that have the same composition
of quasi-identifiers also having the same sensitive value revealing personal information.
Background knowledge attacks happen when a person knows all quasi-identifiers of
another individual and can deduce which sensitive value is linked to that person. Other
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research published an attack classified as minimally attack. This type of attack occurs
when there is new information gained about an individual because the nominal protection
on their personal information (Wong, Fu, Wang, & Pei, 2007). There are challenges in
preserving privacy which has allowed attackers to use external and public data sources to
obtain information to re-identify a user (Gkoulalas-Divanis & Verykios, 2009).
Sweeney’s (2002a) and Machanavajjhala’s et al. (2007), k-anonymity and l-diversity
models have minimized the risk of major attacks.
In differential privacy, decisions have to be made whether an individual’s privacy
is at risk due to the information published in their dataset. Counterfactual and
simulatability approaches are examined to see if the dataset is causing an individual’s
privacy breach (Machanavajjhala & Kifer, 2015). Counterfactual reasoning based idea
showed releasing private information from a database is allowed but divulging
information about an individual is an invasion of privacy. A probability test checks to see
if there is an equal chance of an individual having the sensitive value. This test also see if
an individual’s probability does not have the sensitive value. For example, in differential
privacy model, the algorithm is like a coin toss, there is a 50/50 chance that the person is
or is not a part of the dataset (Dwork, 2009); the same concept applies to a counterfactual
test. There is a 50/50 chance the person does or does not have the sensitive attribute.
Simulatability approach focuses to ensure attackers are unable to identify the statistical
dataset from the original dataset (Machanavajjhala & Kifer, 2015). Before data
publication, these two tests are available to measure privacy disclosure risks.
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Legal Obligations
“Consumer data privacy and security are critical areas of opportunity and concern
for industry and policymakers” (Listokin, 2017, p.92). Personal information has become
easier to collect with the evolution of technology (Lu, Li, Qu, & Hui, 2014). Legislators
have worked to regulate how people’s data can be obtained, utilized, and stored. The E.U.
in May 2018 began enforcement of a new data protection law, which makes it the most
momentous update since the mid-nineties (Arend, 2017). Security and privacy laws in the
U.S. are not set at the national level but instead determined by industry and state (Breaux
& Gordon, 2013). As laws are implemented and modified, privacy-preservation
approaches have to adapt to current regulations, which makes it critical to be
knowledgeable about consumer protection laws.
Taken affect earlier this year, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is
the new E.U. law. This law encourages the transformation of personal data so an attribute
cannot be linked to a specific person without additional data by pseudonymization
(Maldoff, 2016). This means even prior to companies potentially publishing or using
collected data, some alterations should be completed. If found not in compliance with
GDPR, a company could be fined four percent of its annual revenue, or up to 20 million
Euros, whichever returns the higher charge (Arend, 2017). For example, if the Equifax
data breach occurred when GDPR was in effect, the company would be obligated to paid
up to 126 million dollars (Goldman, 2017). This proved the criticality of privacypreservation models and the importance of ensuring models are created that meet current
and future legislation.
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The U.S. does not have a national set of privacy laws for personal information;
regulations are left up to states and the industrial sectors (Breaux & Gordon, 2013).
FERPA and HIPAA are two common standards where legislation requires individuals’
information be safeguarded based on the industry. FERPA prevents disclosure of student
records’ explicit information in educational institutes that receive government funding
(Apricorn, 2016). HIPAA is less ambiguous about how consumers’ information is to be
protected. The health industry defines two privacy rules: expert determination and safe
harbor (HHS, 2012). Expert determination requires qualified personnel apply statistical
principles to de-identify health information. Safe harbor lists 19 specific attributes that
require suppression prior to publication. Since industries define privacy regulations in the
U.S., it would require a great deal of collaboration to define a unified national standard
(Breaux & Gordon, 2013). This makes privacy-preservations models more complex
because it would require algorithms to standardize features that meet a range of industry
criterions.
Summary
Previous research helped provide background knowledge and insight to some
expectations for this study. Even though technology has advanced, there are to this day
restrictions on how individual’s identity can be anonymized from privacy-preservation
models (Dwork & Roth, 2014). Commonly accepted privacy approaches like kanonymity, l-diversity, t-closeness, and differential privacy models have set a standard on
how data can be de-identified (Sharma & Rajawat, 2016). A study found ranking quasiidentifiers and introducing them gradually to a de-identification process resulted in an
improvement of publishable amount of records (Brown, 2017). De-identification
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approaches were re-examined to improve how to apply techniques to anonymize data
(Angiuli & Waldo, 2016). Improvements on Angiuli and Waldo research found a way to
balance suppression and data falsification (Brown, 2017). Many other proposed models
have improved de-identification techniques. Security issues about privacy-preservation
models requires continuously assessment and tested to ensure the highest confidence in
anonymizing a dataset. Corporations must meet legal obligations, so a privacypreservation method needs to be adaptable for data processers to set their anonymization
to the company’s legal requirements. This research was cognitive on potential attacks that
can occur on published datasets from weaknesses in current privacy models. Altogether,
the review of previous research provided a solid foundation for this study.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
Introduction
To create an adaptable algorithm effectively, several aspects of a dataset required
studying. The review of cell-based suppression allowed for the study to better understand
the influence one attribute had on the overall dataset. All processed datasets measured the
precision rate. This research also expanded on Brown's (2017) 1/2k theory by applying
different fractions to a dataset. The use of fractions measured the change in data precision
depending the xk-anonymity. The study changed the amount of quasi-identifiers to see
the impact on precision at different fraction levels of k. Additionally, two of the
experiments included l-diversity to expand on k-anonymity for privacy confirmation. All
of the experiments documented the changes to pre- and post-datasets depending on the
set criteria. All data collected including the total record count, the quasi-identifier pair,
the suppression count, the added records, the cell-based suppression total, and the
generalization total aided in the development of the adaptable algorithm.
Research Design
This experimental dissertation study applied a series of experiments to assist in
the creation of the end algorithm. Each experiment addressed one of the study’s goals.
Experiment 1 measured the influence a single quasi-identifier had on a dataset when
suppressed prior to the processing the overall dataset. Experiment 2 analyzed the impact
on a dataset publication depending on the dataset size. Experiment 3 demonstrated the
influence when processing datasets at different fractions of k. Experiment 4 reviewed the
fluctuation in post-processed dataset when changing the different amounts of quasi-
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identifiers. Experiments 5 and 6 included l-diversity to measure the change in data
suppression. Together, all six of these experiments were essential in the accomplishment
of the research’s goals and the formation of the proposed adaptable algorithm.
Experiment 1: Cell-Based Suppression
The first experiment analyzed the impact on a single quasi-identifier to see the
end difference in publication eligibility. The MIT and Harvard first year of edx course
dataset contains 641,138 published records; the study extracted 250,000 records for a
sample set. Five attributes were marked as quasi-identifiers, with the eligible cellsuppressible quasi-identifier as YOB. There were four different methods applied to the
250,000 dataset.
1. No Generalization, No Cell-Based Suppression
2. Both Generalization and Cell-Based Suppression
3. Only Cell-Based Suppression
4. Only Generalization
These four methods used a single-processing method completed twice, first using the
1/2k theory and second with traditional k-anonymity. The single-processing method
compared all five quasi-identifiers at the same time, unlike Brown’s (2017) research that
used a gradual attribute introduction method. The post-processed dataset measured
precision and utility to comprehend the influence the dataset has when using cell-based
suppression alone and combined with generalization.
Experiment 2: Different Size Datasets
The second experiment focused on the precision impact when using different size
datasets. The key for this experiment was to focus on the precision rate change. The
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overall objective was to construct an adaptable privacy-preservation algorithm that could
apply to diverse style datasets. This experiment showed how the size of a dataset affected
the precision rate. From the sample set of 250,000 records, there were five different subdatasets created: 30,000; 60,000; 120,000; 180,000; and 240,000. By processing a variety
of different size datasets, the research expanded from the first experiment to see the
change in precision. Furthermore, it measured the percentage of the remaining quasiidentifier pairs against all the other datasets. The same four methods, with five quasiidentifiers, were processed twice using the 1/2k theory and traditional k-anonymity.
Experiment 3: xk-anonymity
The third experiment measured the falsification percentage level of k. Different
fraction levels were applied on top of Brown’s (2017) 1/2k fraction. The fractions
included 1/4, 1/3, 1/2, 3/4, and 1. The goal of this experiment was to see how different
fractions(x) of k changed the precision of the dataset. The xk-anonymity model injected a
different fraction to each of the sample datasets. Experiment 3 maintained a singleprocessed approach for each dataset and applied all four methods. From this experiment,
the research began to form the foundational platform on how precision rate changed at
different xk-anonymity approaches.
Experiment 4: Different Number of Quasi-identifiers
As discussed in Yang’s et al. (2013) research, as the number of quasi-identifiers
increased, the amount of data loss increased. The fourth experiment introduced a number
of different quasi-identifiers. This element incorporated the previous experiments’
focuses on cell-based suppression, dataset sizes, and xk-anonymity. There were four
different quasi-identifiers measured: 2, 3, 4, and 5. This research used Brown’s (2017)
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quasi-identifier ranking system, from most important to least important, to list the
attributes as course ID, forum post, gender, YOB, and country. The first two quasiidentifiers processed were course ID and forum post, as they were the most important
attributes. When three quasi-identifiers were processed, it still used course ID and forum
post but added gender. The four quasi-identifier pair process added YOB on top of the
other previous attributes. Lastly, the study measured all five attributes together. The
experiment also processed the datasets using the single-process approach. This
experiment showed the end precision change when fluctuating the quasi-identifiers.
Experiment 5: Inclusion of l-diversity
The fifth experiment added the inclusion of l-diversity. Machanavajjhala et al.
(2007) found k-anonymity weaknesses; to address this weakness, they required l-diversity
to protect individuals’ sensitive information from being exposed. This addition proved
essential for data de-identification. For Experiment 5, all six datasets required
modifications to the grade attribute. The grade attribute applied random false numerical
values to measure l-diversity. The numerical range included 1, .95, .90, .85, .80, .75, .70,
.65, .60, and 0. These values represented a grading scale a professor would give in a
classroom environment, where .95 would be the minimum value for an A, .9 = A-, and so
forth until 0 = F. The datasets were processed using l equaled to three different diversity
levels: 2, 3, or 4. This allowed for the study to understand the impact a sensitive value has
on the entire dataset, depending on the dataset’s size, what fraction of k it is being
processed by and with different amounts of quasi-identifiers within the dataset.
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Experiment 6: Suppression of Sensitive Value
Experiment 6 suppressed sensitive values that did not meet l-diversity. This was a
crucial experiment as records might not meet l requirements, but the quasi-identifier pair
meets xk-anonymity, and the record could provide quality information. This experiment
suppressed any grade cell for records that did not satisfy the l demand. When
implementing this experiment, the four methods from Experiment 1 increased. In total,
there were eight methods processed:
1. No Generalization, No Cell-Based Suppression, No Sensitive Suppression
2. All Three Included Generalization, Cell-Based Suppression, Sensitive
Suppression
3. Generalization, Cell-Based Suppression
4. Generalization, Sensitive Suppression
5. Cell-Based Suppression, Sensitive Suppression
6. Only Cell-Based Suppression
7. Only Generalization
8. Only Sensitive Suppression
By adding the four methods, there were more combinations of anonymization techniques
to analyze the end impact to the post-processed dataset. Data decision makers could
choose any of the eight methods to complete privacy-preservation. The experiment
measured the impact on a dataset when including sensitive suppression at different
fractions and quasi-identifiers.
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Sample Set
This research extracted a sample set from Dataverse HarvardX-MITx PersonCourse Academic year 2013 De-Identified (Harvard, 2014). This publicly available
comma-separated value (csv) file contained 641,138 records with 20 different attributes.
The study created two sample sets from the published dataset: experiment dataset and test
dataset. The experiment dataset contained 250,000 records, and the test datasets extracted
500,000 records from the original dataset. From both sample sets, there were sub-datasets
created. To ensure the experiment dataset proportionally retrieved a quality sample of the
original dataset, there were two main elements considered: course ID and country. The
order of creating the experiment sample set went as followed:
1. Added column U to assign random values, used RAND function to set the record’s
cell value
2. Segregated dataset by course ID into different tabs
3. Copied column Us’ values to column V (to make a static number)
4. Sorted the rows by smallest to largest depending on column V value
5. Started at A1 selected records downward, until right the proportion of records were
extracted
6. Copied selected records to new excel workbook titled sampleset_250000
The test sample set used steps one, three, and four to create the dataset. The lowest
500,000 records made up the test sample. This allowed the test to avoid any proportional
considerations and to have truly a unique collection of records to verify the authenticity
of the algorithm.
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The experiment sample extracted a proportional representation of the original
dataset. Illustrated in Table 1, the study calculated the value each course had on the
overall dataset. For example, out of the 641,138 published records, HarvardX CB22x
2013_Spring had 30,002 published records. That course ID had roughly 4.7% of the total
records count, so the study pulled 11,750 records to equal the correct proportion of the
250,000 record sample set. Some records required modified rounding to assist in the

Table 1 Course Sample Set Extraction

extraction of the 250,000 records. Identified with a superscript 1, those records had the
ten-thousandths value of five, but rounded down to help balance. Identified with
superscript 2, those records had a ten-thousandths value equaled to six, one of the two
were rounded down to extract the set sample value. After collecting the sample set, the
research then crosschecked the sample to the countries’ representations. The difference
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between the published dataset’s country representation and sample set representation was
under ten-thousandths of a difference.
Instrument Development & Validation
The study built two Java-based programs to complete each experiment and test
the end algorithm. The data processing code enabled a semi-automatic process to
anonymize a dataset. There were seven steps assembled to the program: unification,
sensitive value diversification, generalization, cell-based suppression, xk-anonymity
processing, suppression, and confirmation. Since there were multiple inputs that provided
zero information as quasi-identifiers (-, NA, blank), the unification step combined all
three texts to equal “-“. This allowed the quasi-identifier pairs to equally be associated if
there were no valid information given about that attribute. The second step needed only
to occur when l-diversity requirement was in the dataset. This step handled the
suppression of the entire record for traditional l-diversity approaches. This step also
handled the opt-in for sensitive suppression. The third step reviewed the quasi-identifiers
that were under the xk-anonymity criteria and generalized the YOB cell. In the fourth
step, if quasi-identifiers did not meet xk-anonymity, the program suppressed the YOB
cell. For the fifth step, xk-anonymity reviewed each quasi-identifier pair, if the criteria
met xk-anonymity, but was under k-anonymity, the dataset added false records until the
pair met k-anonymity. If the criteria was under xk-anonymity, it marked the associated
records for suppression. The sixth step deleted all records marked for suppression. The
last step confirmed the end quasi-identifier pairs’ total, the records’ total, and that zero
modification needed to occur for the dataset to meet k-anonymity and l-diversity.
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By breaking the data processing program down into seven steps, the study could
complete any of the eight anonymization methods. To best highlight this, below are the
steps used in each of the eight methods for Experiment 6:
1. No Generalization, No Cell-Based Suppression, No Sensitive Suppression
(Steps 1,2,5,6,7)
2. All Three Included Generalization, Cell-Based Suppression, Sensitive
Suppression (Steps 1,2,3,4,5,6,7), opt-in Sensitive Suppression on step 2
3. Generalization, Cell-Based Suppression (Steps 1,2,3,4,5,6,7)
4. Generalization, Sensitive Suppression (Steps 1,2,3,5,6,7), opt-in Sensitive
Suppression on step 2
5. Cell-Based Suppression, Sensitive Suppression (Steps 1,2,4,5,6,7,), opt-in
Sensitive Suppression on step 2
6. Only Cell-Based Suppression (Steps 1,2,4,5,6,7)
7. Only Generalization (Steps 1,2,3,5,6,7)
8. Only Sensitive Suppression (Steps 1,2,5,6,7), opt-in Sensitive Suppression on
step 2
Each step writes two csv files, a quasi-identifier pairs’ information list and a postprocessed dataset. The quasi-identifier pairs’ file included all attribute values in the pairs’
set, the number of records in the pair, and the diversity of the sensitive value. The
creation of each file empowered the study to back-up the step’s action on the dataset
continuously.
To validate the program’s accuracy, a random spot check routinely reviewed the
records for proper modifications. The quasi-identifier pair file documented the imported
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dataset file. This file is valuable when crosschecking the changes of the pre-processed
and post-processed dataset. A spot check reviewed three main elements: if records were
under xk-anonymity that they were marked for suppression, over xk-anonymity but under
k-anonymity false records were added, and pairs that met k-anonymity records were left
alone. In addition, the spot checks confirmed correct generalization and cell-suppression.
The end algorithm’s Java-based program translated the proposed algorithm to
automatically process. The program first ingested and decoded the given csv dataset to
identify the quasi-identifier pairs, the dataset’s record count, and the sensitive diversity. It
provided questions for a user to outline the process criteria. Based on the user’s answers,
the program ran all available xk-anonymity options and documented the results. The
program then compared the results to see which approach provided the best solution for
the dataset with the given requirements. Afterwards, it calculated the precision range and
data loss elements of the algorithm. At the end, the program outputted the recommended
approach, precision range, and maximum data loss. The end algorithm’s Java-based
program confirmed the proposed algorithm’s accuracy by processing each available
approach with and without anonymization techniques through the data processing Java
program.
Data Analysis
There is no commonly accepted standard for measuring the utility loss of a deidentified dataset (Garfinkel, 2015). A key element in any research is the ability to
measure success. Previous researchers built utility matrices to measure pre- and postprocessed datasets (Yang, Li, Zhang, Yu, 2013; Dataverse, 2014). To measure utility, the
research built correlation matrices with Excel’s XLMiner Analysis Toolpak. Then, the
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study measured precision with a similar formula to Sweeney’s (2002b) generalization and
suppression research. First, each cell in the pre-processed data had a set value of one.
When the cell required modification, the cell’s value reduced. Sweeney’s (2002b)
research measured values based on their hierarchy level of generalization, more
generalized the lower the value. Since this research had one level of generalization, a
generalized cell’s value reduced a half a point. If the cell required suppression, the cell’s
value deducted the entire point. At the end of the dataset processing, all cells’ values
made up the total post-processed value. That value divided by the pre-processed total
points resulted in the dataset’s precision.
Milestones
There were six phases to this dissertation research project. The first phrase
extracted two sample sets of the selected dataset. The second phase developed a Java
program and completed all six experiments. After the experiment finalized, there was
enough information collected to analyze and build an algorithm in the third stage. Once
the initial model completed development, the fourth stage tested the system for certainty
with the original experiment datasets and test datasets. The testing results provided
feedback to modify the end algorithm. When all testing and modification completed the
study transitioned to the final stage.
Phase I

Extract Datasets & Modifications

1 Week

Phase II

Coding & Experiments

19 Weeks

Phase III

Create Algorithm

5 Weeks

Phase IV

Testing

5 Weeks

Stage V

Modify

1 Weeks
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Stage VI

Final Report

5 Weeks

Phase II: Experiments

1/16/19

12/15/19

11/5/18

9/29/18

8/25/18

8/4/18

7/14/18

5/26/18

5/12/18

4/21/18

4/4/18

Milestones
Idea Paper
Approval
Proposal Paper
Proposal Defense
Experiments I
Experiment II
Experiment III
Experiment IV
Experiment V
Experiment VI
Algorithm
Test/Modify
Write Report(s)
Peer Editing
Submit Research
Dissertation
Defense

11/30/17

Cell-Based Suppression (YOB)
Different Size Datasets (30,000, 60,000, 120,000, 180,000, 240,000, 250,000)
xk-anonymity (1/4, 1/3, 1/2, 2/3, 3/4, 7/8, 1)
Different Quasi-identifiers (2, 3, 4, 5)
Inclusion of l-diversity (Grade)
Suppression of l (Grade)

9/9/17

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Resources
This dissertation research required several elements. First, the study required the
Dataverse’s dataset to conduct the series of experiments, as well as create the test dataset
samples. The adaptable algorithm used foundational elements of the code designed for
Brown’s (2017) 1/2k theory study. Java Eclipse used the Java IDE to design the
programs. A Lenovo ThinkPad laptop with an Intel core i7 conducted all the experiments,
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tests, and validations. This laptop hosts a Windows 7 operating system, which has 8GB
of memory.
Summary
The methodology chapter outlined the action plan for the dissertation. There were
six phases to the study including testing the final proposed algorithm and dissertation
report writing process. Phase two divided into six experiments. The experiments broke
down the different aspects of the research: quasi-identifiers, sensitive value, cell-based
suppression, sensitive suppression, and xk-anonymity. Lastly, this chapter contained
details on the required resources, data sampling, and milestones necessary to accomplish
this research.
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Chapter 4
Results
Data Analysis
Each experiment aided in the development of this study’s proposed algorithm.
Experiment 1 demonstrated a single quasi-identifier attribute could positively affect the
outcome of the post-processed dataset. Experiment 2 showed as the dataset sizes
increased the precision also increased. Experiment 3 illustrated different fractions
balanced a dataset’s suppression and falsification count. Experiment 4 proved when a
dataset of the same size has different quasi-identifier amounts, their end balance of
suppression and falsification changed. Lastly, Experiments 5 and 6 focused on ldiversity; these experiments highlighted when a dataset included sensitive values it can
considerably affect the original record outcome if sensitive suppression is not applied. All
the data analysis done from these experiments led to the creation of the adaptable
algorithm.
Experiment 1: Cell-Based Suppression
The application of anonymization techniques on a dataset proved to have advantages and
disadvantages. In both the 1/2k-anonymity and k-anonymity approaches, traditional
methods without any anonymization techniques resulted in the highest precision, outlined
in Table 2. In contrast, traditional methods had the highest suppression count and lowest
amount of original records. When applying both generalization and cell-based
suppression on the dataset, the post-processed dataset had the higher total record count,
but also had the most added records. Approaches that included cell-based suppression
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Table 2 Experiment 1 Comparison Chart (250k)

had the highest amount of original records and the lowest suppressed records. Between
generalization and cell-based suppression techniques, when applying only generalization,
or when applying generalization before cell-based suppression, the dataset had higher
suppression counts, more added records, and less original records with modifications than
the dataset processed with only cell-based suppression.
This analysis began the process of extracting key pieces of information for the
end algorithm. Primarily, cell-based suppression resulted in the highest original records,
including original modified records and the lowest suppression. This means even if the
traditional method only applied cell-based suppression, there was a higher potential of
saving more records from suppression. Traditional methods provided the maximum
precision value, which means any approach with anonymization techniques applied
decreased the precision. The more details collected, the more versatile the algorithm
became.
Experiment 2: Different Size Datasets
Transitioning from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2, the anonymization pattern remained
the same, which defended Experiment 1’s analysis. From the original dissertation
proposal, Experiment 2 hypothesized that it would show how the dataset size affected the
precision. Displayed in Table 3, as the dataset sizes increased the precision increased.
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Table 3 Experiment 2 Precision Comparison

Furthermore, the closer the dataset sizes were to each other and the higher the total record
count, the lower the gap between the differences in the average precision. As the dataset
size increased, the amount of added records also increased. Table 4 compares 30,000 and
240,000 record datasets; the additional records nearly doubled between dataset sizes.
However, the suppression of records did not follow that pattern. In five out of the eight
approaches, the 240,000 record dataset had less suppression than 30,000. These findings
led the research to review the quasi-identifiers.
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Table 4 Experiment 2 Comparison 30k & 240k

After Experiment 2’s analysis, the study hypothesized it was not the dataset size
that affected precision, but the quasi-identifiers meeting the approach’s requirements that
affected precision. Table 5 compared, at each dataset size, the number of quasi-identifier
pairs and amount of records that fulfilled each approach’s requirements. From this
review, the higher the dataset size, the more total quasi-identifier pairs, which in turn
allowed for more quasi-identifiers and records to meet each approach’s criteria. As the
dataset size increased, the number of quasi-identifier pairs and records that met each
criteria increased. For example, the 60,000 record dataset had 45.75% of quasi-identifiers
and 85.85% of records meet 1/2k-anonymity; however, as the dataset size increased to
180,000, the number of quasi-identifiers that met 1/2k-anonymity were 71.50% and
records were 94.42%. This led to the conclusion the higher the dataset size, the more
quasi-identifier pairs will meet 1/2k-anonymity requirement.
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Table 5 Experiment 2 QP & Record Comparison

Experiment 3: xk-anonymity
Changing the fraction can drastically change the dataset outcome. The original
proposed set of fractions were 1/4, 1/3, 1/2, 2/3, 3/4, 7/8, and 1; however, since multiple
fractions rounded to the same whole number when multiplying x of k, where k = 5, the
research limited the fractions to 1/4, 1/3, 1/2, 3/4, and 1. Even with a lower quantity of
different fractions, the study found many factors impacted how the fractions processed
the dataset for anonymity. This experiment found a trend in the post-processed dataset.
As the fractions increased, the difference in precision of original records and the
precision of original records including records with modifications increased. For
example, Table 6 compared 1/3k, 1/2k, and 3/4k for the 180,000 record dataset. The
difference in average precisions with and without modifications equaled .3743 for 1/3k,
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Table 6 Experiment 3 Precision Trend

1.8199 for 1/2k, and 3.7021 for 3/4k. This proved precision range fluctuated depending
on the fraction and the anonymization techniques. Another takeaway from this
comparison, as fractions increased the importance of applying anonymization techniques
to keep original records became more essential. When processing the dataset with 1/3kanonymity approach with generalization and cell-based suppression, the difference of the
two precisions was .7711; however, in 3/4k-anonymity approach the difference increased
to 5.5019.
From Experiment 4’s analysis, the research learned more about the association
between dataset sizes and fractions. Table 7 documented the suppression, addition, total
records, precision, and original records changes for all the approaches. In addition, it took
the absolute difference of addition and suppression and the average of those differences
at each fraction level. Based on these results the average lowest absolute difference
varied depending on the dataset sizes. The 30,000, 240,000, and 250,000 record datasets’
lowest difference average were 1/2k, whereas, the 60,000, 120,000, and 180,000 record
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datasets’ were 3/4k. This highlighted there was not always one fraction that produced the
best balance of suppression and addition.

Table 7 Experiment 3 Dataset Sizes and Fractions Changes

Experiment 4: Different Number of Quasi-identifiers
Once the datasets reviewed the records at various quasi-identifier amounts, it
became clear there was a significant connection between the quasi-identifier pairs that
met xk-anonymity. Illustrated in Table 8, as xk-anonymity and quasi-identifiers increased
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Table 8 Experiment 4 30k QPs & Records Comparison

the suppression of records increased. Another observation found as the quasi-identifier
pairs and xk-anonymity increased the amount of records that met the fraction increased.
Logistically, this transpired because there was a decreased in the amount of records that
fulfilled k-anonymity. For example, when the quasi-identifier value equaled two there
were 11 records that equaled to 1/4k, but once the quasi-identifier value increased to five
there were 4009 records equaled to 1/4k. As the quasi-identifier pairs increased, the
number of records that met k-anonymity decreased resulting in more records meeting xkanonymity. Experiment 4 illustrated the importance of understanding the effects of
publishing a dataset with higher quasi-identifiers and the influence potential of
processing at different fractions.
By introducing different quasi-identifiers, the research started to develop the
knowledge necessary to process datasets with diverse attribute amounts. This experiment

51

showcased there was no clear answer to balancing noise and data loss. Each dataset
individually required a review of the number of records that met the quasi-identifier pairs
at each fraction to see which xk-anonymity holds the best balance.
Experiment 5: Inclusion of l-diversity
The fifth experiment highlighted the effects of a dataset containing sensitive
values. In this experiment, each dataset processed three separate times with different
diversity requirements, l = 2, 3, or 4. First, during this experiment, the study discovered
when processing a dataset that included a sensitive value the fractions under the diversity
requirement produced the same outcome as the fraction that equals the diversity
requirement. For example, when the diversity requirement was three, 1/3k and 1/2k
yielded the same outcome because 1/3k would only require two records in the quasiidentifier pair set; however, that would not fulfill the diversity requirement, thus resulting
in suppression. Table 9 outlined the difference in results when the 250,000 record dataset
processed with a diversity requirement of two and three. From these results, the research
revealed as the diversity requirement increased the number of total records published
decreased.

52

Table 9 Experiment 5 250k, QP =4, Comparison at Diversity of 2 & 3

Experiment 6: Suppression of Sensitive Value
To counter the effects of Experiment 5, Experiment 6 suppressed just the sensitive
value in the records where the quasi-identifier pair did not meet the diversity requirement.
When using this anonymization technique a post-processed dataset kept more original
records and more quasi-identifier pairs, but there was an increase in additional false
records. Table 10 detailed the 29 different approaches in processing the 30,000 record
dataset when the quasi-identifier equaled five and diversity requirement was two. This

Table 10 Experiment 6, 30k, Q5, D2 Comparison Chart

example highlighted the best anonymization approach to produce the highest original
records included the anonymization technique sensitive suppression. Interestingly, in
some of the dataset sizes, once the approach reached 3/4k, both traditional and sensitive
suppression methods suppressed and added the same amount of records. This showed in
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some cases that even with sensitive suppression the dataset does not show improvement
in post-processed results because the records with the anonymization technique applied
does not meet xk-anonymity.
Experiment 5 and 6 brought new knowledge to the research that assisted in
understanding how to best process datasets with a sensitive value. Experiment 5 found
that it was not plausible to consider xk-anonymity where x is less than the diversity
criteria. Furthermore, the lower the diversity the higher the end quasi-identifier pairs and
original records but the lower the precision. From Experiment 6, sensitive suppression
can aid in maintaining more records, but alone this anonymization technique may not be
enough to keep more records. In most cases however sensitive suppression in
combination with additional anonymization techniques could result in more published
records.
Research Question Answers
After completing the six experiments, there was enough knowledge learned to
answer all five research questions. These answers guided the study to create an adaptable
algorithm dependent on the diverse composition of the dataset.
Can a single quasi-identifier affect the precision rate of the overall publishable dataset
by more than two percent?
Experiment 1 focused on examining one quasi-identifier’s impact on the overall
dataset’s ability to publish more records. In both 1/2k-anonymity and traditional kanonymity, having one record modified and/or suppressed did not affect the precision
rate by more than two percent when comparing the highest percentages of each approach,
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displayed in Table 2. However, Table 11 when comparing between the two anonymity
approaches there was a difference greater than two percent. When completing cell-based

Table 11 Experiment 1 Original & Original with Modification
Comparison

suppression in the 1/2k-anonymity approach the precision for original records is
96.4146% while k-anonymity only comes to 94.3136%. In return, when reviewing the
precision including modified records 1/2k-anonymity is 97.9679% and k-anonymity
99.7157%. Experiment 1 illustrated when combining a dataset’s anonymization approach
with a single cell value suppression the overall publishable dataset has the potential to
affect the publishable amount by more than two percent.
Alternatively, in Experiment 2, there was a difference of more than two percent
precision on the 1/2k-anonoymity approach for a dataset size of 30,000, illustrated in
Table 4.When processing this specific dataset, the end precision fluctuated significantly.
Without using any anonymization techniques, the end precision was 90.8157%, but when
using both generalization and cell-based suppression anonymization techniques the
precision changed to 87.6195%, cell-based suppression alone was 91.2931%, and
generalization was 88.1169%. These results directly confirmed, by more than two percent
precision difference, a single cell value could affect the publication quantity of a dataset.
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What impact does different size datasets have on precision rate?
The primary goal of Experiment 2 was to analyze the difference in results of
different size datasets. Exhibited in Table 12, averaging the eight different methods for
each dataset size, the precision increased the larger the dataset: 30k – 94.2599%, 60k95.9465%, 120k – 97.5599%, 180k – 98.3778%, 240k – 98.8226%, and 250k –
98.8731%. Based on the findings it was rational to state the larger the dataset size, the

Table 12 Experiment 2 Precision Comparison (30k - 250k)

higher the precision, but a deeper dive into each dataset provided more insight on this
trend. As the dataset sizes increased, so did the quasi-identifier pairs, shown in Table 5.
Additionally, the percentage of quasi-identifier pairs that met k-anonymity increased.
This information changed the conclusion that a dataset size alone does not affect the
precision rate; more importantly, it was the number of quasi-identifier pairs that met kanonymity requirement that influenced the precision rate.
Does processing a dataset with a lower fraction level of k improve the precision rate?
The precision rate decreased when a dataset was processed at a lower fraction
level of k. Experiments 1 and 2 used two different fractions, 1/2k and k. Experiment 1’s
average precision had about a two percent difference, where 1/2k approach averaged
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97.8862% and k approach averaged 99.8600%, displayed under 250k in Table 12. This
tendency continued in Experiment 2. Experiment 3 introduced xk-anonymity with an
additional three fractions. As the fractions increased, the precision rates increased. For
example, Table 7 outlined all the datasets processed at each fraction level. The 120,000
record dataset, the lowest fraction, 1/4, only had an 83.7258% precision, once processed
with traditional anonymity the precision averaged 99.6635%. Based on the first three
experiments, the research concluded the lower the fraction, the lower the precision.
What affects can different quantities of quasi-identifiers have on a dataset of the same
size?
On the surface, the different size quasi-identifiers affected the end publication
amount of records differently in the same size dataset. In Experiment 4, the study
processed datasets with four different quasi-identifier sizes (2, 3, 4, and 5). As the
number of quasi-identifiers increased, the end total records decreased, as well as the
precision. These findings defended Yang’s et al. (2013) results when handling more
quasi-identifiers the data loss increased; however, when analyzing the data further, there
appeared to be a bigger reason why there was a decrease in published records. After
reviewing the 60,000 record dataset, there was a trend between the quasi-identifier values
that directly affected the end publication quantity, highlighted in Table 13. When there
was two quasi-identifiers, 42 out of the 69 different quasi-identifier pairs met kanonymity, 60.8696% of the pairs; however, once the quasi-identifier pairs reached five
only 2963 of the 11335 pairs met k-anonymity, 26.1403%. As the total ratio of pairs
decreased in meeting k-anonymity, the amount of publishable records also decreased.
Interestingly, when the dataset had three quasi-identifiers 56.5517% met k-anonymity, at
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Table 13 Experiment 4 60k QP & Records Comparison

four quasi-identifiers there were 58.0367%, meaning proportionally more pairs met kanonymity at four than three, but overall, the number of records associated with the pairs
still decreased. This was why the trend in records continued to decrease as the value of
quasi-identifiers increased. Considering this example and all the experiments’ results,
different quantities of quasi-identifiers can have a large impact on a dataset of the same
size.
How does diversity value affect the overall record quantity in a single dataset?
When datasets have sensitive values, in order to begin anonymization, the quasiidentifier pairs must meet not only xk-anonymity, but also the diversity value set.
Experiment 5 and 6 focused on l-diversity requirements. Experiment 5 discovered as the
diversity requirements increased the number fractions available to process the dataset
decreased. In Experiment 6, by suppressing the sensitive value when a quasi-identifier
pair does not meet the diversity criteria, more records met eligibility for publication, but
the precision decreased. Depending on the significance of the sensitive value to all other
details in a record, it may or may not be worth utilizing sensitive suppression. When the
research included a sensitive value, the lower the diversity requirement the higher the
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total records, quasi-identifier pairs, and original records. In contrast, the higher the
diversity requirement the higher the precision. The diversity criteria greatly influenced
the anonymization process.
Algorithm
The goal of this dissertation research was to create an adaptable algorithm that
only required a data processor to provide three pieces of information. It also enabled the
ability of the processor to provide more information than necessary to customize the
results. This allowed the research to outline the process of determining the best fraction
as followed (* notes optional to the processor):

Figure 1 User Requirements and Options

Best Fraction
When reviewing the data collected from the six experiments many factors
highlighted as potential key elements in determining the best fraction to process a dataset:
data loss, quasi-identifier pair diversity, precision, difference in suppression and
falsification, original records, amount of records saved due to xk-anonymity, and false
data. From those candidates, many elements unfairly favored the lowest fraction available
or the traditional approach. The one key element that provided some balance was the
difference. The absolute difference between added and suppressed records allowed for
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neither the lowest fraction nor traditional method to automatically be classified as the
best approach; it did however, tend to favor one of the fractions in the middle because the
datasets did not meet k-anonymity. The biggest influence in including the difference was
it did not automatically mark one fraction the best. This element relied on the quasiidentifier pairs’ records count that met the fraction conditions to align the fraction
ranking against the other fraction approaches.
In the end, three elements factored in the calculation of the algorithm’s
recommended xk-anonymity: precision, original records, and absolute difference of
addition and suppression. The first element factored into the algorithm, precision, favored
a more traditional approach in anonymizing a dataset, as proven continuously throughout
all six experiments. To equally counter precision, the original records published required
inclusion. These two elements cancelled each other out when a data processor does not
have a preference on how to anonymize their dataset. For example, Table 14 charts
Experiment 3’s 180,000 record dataset; as the fractions increased the precision increased
and the original records including approaches with modifications decreased. The
balanced element between the other two factors was the absolute difference of data
falsification and suppression.
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Table 14 Experiment 3 - 180k Chart

Experiment 4 introduced processing a dataset of the same size with different
quasi-identifiers. As concluded in the research questions, quasi-identifier pairs was
essential when developing an adaptable algorithm. Table 15 illustrated the 30,000 record
dataset processed with the quasi-identifier set to two, three, four and five. In this table,
there were three factors outlined and ranked. Once the dataset reached five quasiidentifiers the approach with the least difference between suppression and addition
recommended 1/3k-anonymity. After reviewing the quasi-identifier pairs and records at
each requirement, there was substantial difference in quasi-identifier pairs and records
suppression when there are at least five quasi-identifiers, documented in Table 8. For
example, when there were four quasi-identifiers 28,543 records met k-anonymity, but
when there were five quasi-identifiers there were only 17,769. This was a drastic
decrease in records meeting k-anonymity compared to four. Quasi-identifiers two, three,
and four were all within 2,000 records of k-anonymity, whereas there was a difference
larger than 10,000 once the where a total of five quasi-identifiers. This resulted in a
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Table 15 Experiment 4 30k Different QPs Requirements

higher data loss. These results demonstrated depending on the quasi-identifier
requirement, a dataset of the same size can have a difference balance fraction.
Besides the elements that calculated the best xk-anonymity, l-diversity
requirement directly influenced the overall recommendation. The process used
throughout Experiments 5 and 6 first reviewed the quasi-identifier pairs that did not meet
l-diversity requirement. In Experiment 5, records that did not meet the diversity criteria
needed suppression. Results of Experiment 5 showed if the fraction was less than the
diversity requirement, those equivalent pairs’ records applied suppression anyway. This
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influenced the algorithm when processing a dataset that needs l-diversity, and excluded
sensitive suppression. If a dataset does not have a sensitive value or the data processor
elects to include sensitive suppression anonymization technique, the algorithm can
review all fraction levels. If the dataset has a sensitive value and does not opt-in for
sensitive

Figure 2 Fraction Algorithm

suppression then there is a limited fraction opportunity.
Ultimately, for an adaptable algorithm to recommend the best xk-anonymity
approach, the dataset may go through five levels of processing. First, if there are no
sensitive values or the processor elects into sensitive value suppression the xk fraction
would begin reviewing the dataset when xk = 1. If the dataset has a sensitive value, then
xk is set to the diversity criteria value. Second, a series of if-else statements matches the
quasi-identifier pair to the equivalent statement. The sensitive value process initially
reviews the quasi-identifier pair’s diversity value because if the pair does not meet the
diversity requirement it did matter if the pair meets xk-anonymity it requires suppression.
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If the quasi-identifier pair total records (QP#) is greater than or equal to k then the QP# is
added to the total records fulfilling k-anonymity (krecords). There are two actions when
QP# is less than k, but greater than or equal to xk-anonymity. The difference between k
and QP# is the total additional records (addrecords) that needs to be added to the dataset.
Furthermore, QP# is added to the total records meeting xk-anonymity (xkrecords). When
the QP# is less than xk-anonymity the records value is added to the suppression group
(suppressrecords). At the third stage, once all the dataset’s quasi-identifier pairs went
through the second level for one fraction, there is enough collected information to
calculate the original records, total records, absolute difference of added and suppressed
records, and precision of the dataset. The xk fraction then increases by one and the dataset
is re-processed with that criteria; steps two and three loop until xk=k. Step four
determines the rank of each fraction level. If more than one xk-anonymity approach ranks
the highest then additional processing determines the recommended fraction.
Step five provides three additional points to determine the recommended dataset
fraction. As seen in Table 15, when processing the 30,000 record dataset with a
preference all four quasi-identifiers requirements originally had at least two fractions
equal: quasi-identifiers two, three and four occurred when they preferred original records
and quasi-identifier five when it preferred precision. The first additional layer narrows
down the ranking to sum of the preference and absolute difference. If still more than one
fraction equals, then the algorithm selects the higher ranked fraction in the preference
category. If the preference has more than one equal, the algorithm recommends the
higher fraction. When there are no preferences, the absolute difference determines the
recommended fraction.
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By creating the three additional points in step five, the algorithm is more versatile
to finding a recommended xk-anonymity approach. In addition, the inclusion of
preferences aids in adapting to the data processors desires. Table 15 showed the changes
in the recommended xk-anonymity approach depending on the data processor’s
preference and the end rankings. At two, three, and four quasi-identifier requirements
with no preference or a preference of precision, the recommended approach is 1/2kanoymity; however, when preferring original records it decreased to 1/3k-anonymity.
Preferences aid in the adaptability of the algorithm.
Some combination of requirements may find the best approach of processing a
dataset with a traditional k-anonymity. In these situations, two approaches are
recommended, the traditional approach and the next ranked fraction. The suggestion of a
second approach provides the data processor with a comparison between the traditional
method and an xk-anonymity approach. One part of their criteria could directly impact the
recommended fraction and by mentioning another approach the data processor may be
more open to processing the dataset differently, or at the very least allow them to
compare the difference in end publication, to see which post-processed dataset gives their
audience the most value.
Precision Range
Precision range was particularly difficult to discover. Between all experiments,
there were no patterns between fractions, dataset sizes, or quasi-identifiers. In order to
formulate how to set a precision range the algorithm had to take into account known
facts. At least two of the three anonymization techniques did not factor into the
recommended xk-anonymity approach. In every scenario, processing a dataset without
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anonymization techniques resulted in the highest amount of suppressed records. The
precision range can considerably vary depending on the amount of records that meet xkanonymity once applying anonymization techniques. The lowest value an anonymization
technique can apply to the quasi-identifiers without removing the entire record was to
suppress one of quasi-identifier’s cell value. With these four details in mind, the research
created a formula to define the precision range.

Equation 1 Precision Range

In order to define a precision range multiple values must be captured: the number
of suppressed records, the quasi-identifier value, the original records remaining, the total
records, the number of added records, the absolute difference between added and
suppressed records, the precision value, and the diversity criteria (if applicable). The
highest precision potential in an xk-anonymity approach occurs when there is zero
anonymization techniques, so the highest value in the precision range equals the
calculated precision value at the recommended xk-anonymity rate, rounded up. To define
the lowest value in the precision range, facts previously discovered aided in the
calculation. With the highest amount of suppression occurring in non-anonymization
technique methods, the formula takes the suppressed value and multiples the records by
the quasi-identifier value minus one. The deduction of one is to factor in cell-based
suppression, the lowest potential value in anonymization techniques. That result is added
to the result of the original records kept in xk-anonymity multiplied by the number of
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quasi-identifiers to create the dividend part of the formula. The formula then combined
three values: the lower value of records suppressed or added records, the absolute
difference, and the total records. The sum of these values multiplied by the quasiidentifier value set the divisor. The lower value between addition and subtraction applied
because the algorithm used an absolute difference to find the best fraction.
After finding the lowest possible value (lpv), the result is multiplied by 100 to set
it to a percentage format. The last step in setting the lowest precision value depends on
the dataset’s sensitivity. If the dataset has a sensitive value and the processor considers
sensitive suppression then the minimum diversity value must be deducted from the
minimum precision. When processing a dataset with sensitive value suppression, the
approach is open to all fractions; however, the precision changes depending on the
diversity required, shown in Figure 3. As the diversity criteria increased the precision
decreased about a half percent, so to compensate this decline the minimum precision
subtracts the diversity set value. If the dataset does not have sensitive value or the
processor is not open for sensitive suppression then the minimum precision is reduced by
one.
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Figure 3 Precision Range with Sensitive Suppression

Data Loss

Equation 2 Maximum Data Loss

The last element in the algorithm measured the maximum data loss. The data loss
is always highest when there is no anonymization techniques applied, shown in Table 7.
To calculate the data loss with the information learned in the fraction algorithm, the data
loss is the result of the recommended xk-anonymity’s suppressed records count divided
by the original dataset record total (minus a title row, if included). The result multiplied
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by a hundred, rounded up, provided the maximum data loss percentage in the
recommended approach.
Preferences
For the algorithm to be adaptable, it must provide a data processor with options.
When there is a sensitive value in the dataset, the processor has an option to suppress the
sensitive value if the quasi-identifier pair does not meet the diversity requirement,
otherwise all records associated with the quasi-identifier pair is suppressed. Beside the
sensitive value option, setting a minimum precision can influence the end recommended
precision. For example, in Table 15, with a 30,000 record dataset and a quasi-identifier
value of five, if the minimum precision was 98%, without a preference set, none of the
xk-anonymity approaches would meet criteria. The algorithm goes down the ranking
approaches until it found a fraction that met the minimum requirement, which would be
k-anonymity.
A processor can also set a preference of precision or original records to help
determine the result. Table 15 showed how a data processor’s preference can
significantly influence the recommended approach. When original records was preferred,
the quasi-identifier five recommend the same fraction as it did with no preferences;
however, quasi-identifiers two, three, and four needed additional processing. Quasiidentifiers two and four ended up decreasing the recommended xk-anonymity approach
from 1/2k to 1/3k.
Opposite of a data processor’s preference of original records, when the preference
equaled precision, the quasi-identifies five had additional layers of processing required.
The example in Table 15 required two additional layers of processing. The largest
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transition occurred when the quasi-identifier equaled five. With the preference set to
precision three fractions totaled the best, as well as the next layer of processing. In the
end, when preferring precision, the recommended fraction was the traditional kanonymity. These examples attests that preferences can affect the end recommended
approach, tailoring this to be an adaptable algorithm.
Algorithm Validation
The research validated the algorithm with multiple datasets including the
experiment sample datasets and the test sample datasets. The experiment datasets were
the original six datasets used to conduct all experiments: 30,000; 60,000; 120,000;
180,000; 240,000; and 250,000. The second set of datasets first extracted a new dataset
from Dataverse, HarvardX-MITx Person-Course Academic year 2013 De-Identified
(Harvard, 2014). This sample had 500,000 records; based on this sample the research
created two subset datasets: 20,000 and 300,000. Combining the experiment and testing
sample datasets, the study reviewed a range of dataset sizes in order to validate the
algorithms’ recommended fraction, precision range, and maximum data loss.
Experiment Datasets
Figure 4 validated the algorithm’s recommended approach, precision range, and
maximum data loss precision based on Table 15’s predictions. The tests conducted on the
30,000 record dataset exemplifies the algorithm’s ability to predict dynamically the
precision range. For example, when the quasi-identifier value was five the precision
range was 9%, with a value of four the range was 3%, and a value of three or two only
1%. Quasi-identifiers two and three only displayed one approach as the experiments did
not conduct any generalization or cell-based suppression at those values. These tests also
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Figure 4 Validation of 30k with Different Quasi-identifier Amounts

confirmed the algorithm’s ability to calculate the most data loss when processing the
dataset with the recommended xk-anonymity approach. When the quasi-identifier value
equaled five there were 4,009 records suppressed. By dividing the suppressed records
from the original record count of 30,000, the data loss is approximately 13.3633%.
Rounding the data loss value up to the nearest whole number, the method confirmed the
algorithm’s prediction of a maximum data loss of 14%.
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To validate preferences, based on Table 15, when the dataset had four quasiidentifiers with a preference of original records and when the dataset had five quasiidentifiers with a preference of precision the recommended approaches changed. Figure 5
charted Experiment 4’s results when processing the dataset with quasi-identifiers four
and five, as well as the algorithm’s recommendations. The algorithm’s approach matched
Table 15’s prediction, fit in the precision range, and accurately concluded the maximum
data loss. When quasi-identifier five preferred precision the algorithm displayed both
traditional k-anonymity and 3/4k-anonymity for a data processor to consider an
alternative.

Figure 5 Valuation of Preference Influence

Test Datasets
After multiple tests using the experiment datasets, independent tests certified the
generalizability with different datasets at different diversity levels and quasi-identifier
sizes. The first test conducted on the three new datasets only included a quasi-identifier
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value of four, without any sensitive values. In this test, each dataset presented a different
combination of results, highlighted in Figure 6. Then, Table 16 certified the algorithm’s
predictions.

Figure 6 Test Datasets with QP=4

Table 16 highlighted each of the three test datasets’ recommendations based on
the end results at each fraction level, when the datasets have four quasi-identifiers. When
preferring original records in the 500,000 record dataset, the recommended
anonymization method decreased to 1/4k. By doing this approach, zero records were
suppressed. There were only 313 records added, which meant overall many records met
k-anonymity, and there was minimal impact on the overall dataset when adding limited
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Table 16 Test Dataset Approach Comparison, QP = 4

amounts of records. Next, the 300,000 record dataset increased slightly when preferring
precision, from 1/2k to 3/4k. Lastly, the 20,000 record dataset showed the largest
different depending on the xk-anonymity approach used. All in all, these three datasets
provided a larger range than the original experiment datasets.
The next series of tests, inspired by the dissertation’s goal example, had the
criteria for five quasi-identifiers and a single sensitive value with a diversity of three.
These tests reviewed the datasets with and without sensitive suppression, charted in
Figure 7. Each dataset had different effects when including sensitive suppression. Both
the 500,000 and 20,000 record datasets fluctuated the recommended approach; however,
the 300,000 record dataset remained the same. The one difference in the 300,000 record
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dataset was the precision range. The anonymization technique sensitive suppression
changed the precision range.

Figure 7 Test Datasets QP=5, Diversity = 3, with and without Sensitive Suppression

To confirm the results, the datasets processed the recommended approaches to
ensure accuracy of precision range and data loss. Table 17 outlined the recommended
fraction given the criteria in Figure 7. All three datasets only processed one method when
excluding sensitive suppression. This occurred because the research’s data process states
any quasi-identifiers that meets xk-anonymity has k-xk amount of records added. Since
the diversity criteria is three, the dataset suppresses records under three and any records
over three created data noise. All records processed at 1/2k-anonymity satisfied the xkanonymity requirement, which removed any additional anonymization techniques. When
including sensitive suppression all four methods were eligible approaches. The 20,000
record dataset illustrated the influence when a dataset is or is not processed with sensitive
suppression. This dataset changed the recommended approach; additionally, there were
major changes in precision range and data loss.
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Table 17 Test Validation QP=5, Diversity=3

The 20,000 record dataset provided the largest precision range difference between
the three test datasets, which made it the prime candidate to test the minimum precision
percent criteria. If the dataset required a minimum precision of 90%, the results from
Figure 7 would require the recommended approach to change when including sensitive
suppression. Figure 8 illustrated the change from 1/2k to 3/4k when using sensitive
suppression and a minimum precision rate of 90%. Likewise, Figure 8 confirmed there
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were no changes when excluding sensitive suppress and when processing the dataset
without a diversity criterion.

Figure 8 Test Dataset 20k, Minimum Precision

The study confirmed Figure 8’s results by processing the dataset at the different
criteria. Figure 9 confirmed when processing the 20,000 dataset within the set criteria, the
minimum precision is at least 90%. By validating this test, it also certified the precision
range and maximum data loss accuracy.

Figure 9 20k Minimum Precision Validation
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The final series of tests verified the preferences’ influence. Figure 10 tested both
precision and original records preferences. Crosschecking Figure 10’s results with Table
16, the research substantiated the approach recommendations based on preferences.
When processing the 300,000 record dataset with the quasi-identifier value of four and
with a preference of precision, the results recommended 3/4k-anonymity. This result
increased the approach from the original non-preference process. Oppositely, when
processing 500,000 record dataset with the quasi-identifier value of four and a preference
of original records, the result decreased to 1/4k-anonymity.

Figure 10 Validation of Test Datasets Preferences

Utility
Since there is no standard for utility loss (Garfinkel, 2015), the researched used a
correlation matrix to compare pre- and post-processed datasets. In comparing these
matrixes, the study was able to visualize how anonymizing a dataset with the
recommended xk-anonymity model affects the attribute relationships. The research tested
the utility on the three test datasets: 20,000, 300,000, and 500,000. Three different
correlation comparison occurred depending on the approach’s recommendation,
displayed in Table 18. In that table, the datasets had four quasi-identifiers: course ID,
form post, gender, and YOB. Two of the quasi-identifiers were non-numeric values,
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Table 18 Utility Test Datasets QP = 4

which required transformation. Course ID and gender changed to numeric values by
setting courses range to 0-15 and gender 0-3. After making those two adjustments the
datasets had correlation matrix built comparing the four quasi-identifier relations. The
200,000 record dataset resulted in the largest impact on attribute relationship. When
analyzing the difference against the other two datasets, this specific dataset had the
largest data loss, highest absolute difference, and most added noise. The 300,000 record
dataset compared the results when preferring precision. This dataset had less difference
than the 20,000 record datasets, but more than the 500,000. The 300,000 record dataset
did have data loss, because of the recommended approach, which influenced the end
correlation between attributes. Finally, the 500,000 record dataset compared the dataset
processed with the preference of original records. This dataset had the lowest relationship
difference. These tests showed that processing datasets with these anonymization
methods can impact the end attribute relationship.
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Summary of Results
The result’s chapter documented the significance of each element of this research.
It began with a brief discussion of each experiment conducted and its worth to the general
production of an adaptable algorithm. It ensured, based on the experiment’s analyzed
data, the study answered each research question. From those findings, the project had
enough core information to design the algorithm. The third part proposed the algorithm,
certifying its design with the discoveries learned. It then verified the effectiveness of the
adaptability in the algorithm through testing experiment and test datasets. The last part to
the chapter compared the utility difference in pre- and post-datasets. This chapter gave a
thorough explanation of the all the data aspects to this project.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary
Foundational research provided the building blocks for this study’s creation of an
adaptable algorithm. The k-anonymity and l-diversity models set precedence on key
attributes that potentially exposed personal information of an individual and how to
protect them against such breaches (Sweeney, 2002a; Machanavajjhala et al., 2007). The
1/2k theory found benefits compromising k-anonymity with false records to keep more
original records (Brown, 2017). Those studies enabled this research to create a core set of
experiments that assisted in the development of the algorithm.
The analysis of the six experiments conducted in the study established the basis
needed to create the research’s adaptable algorithm. First, discovered in Experiment 1,
there was value and influence in suppressing a single quasi-identifier attribute to those
pairs that did not fulfill requirements. Secondly, the balance between falsification and
precision cannot be a unified approach across all datasets. All datasets are composed of a
unique group of attributes and qualities that require an investigation. This examination
must review the quasi-identifier pairs and the amount of records that are in each pair. In
addition, if there is a sensitive value in the dataset, the pair must review the satisfaction of
the diversity requirement. Each experiment held value and brought new knowledge to the
study’s work.
In order for this algorithm to be a success, it had to overcome two main obstacles.
The algorithm had to overcome the primary obstacle of the contrasting goals of privacy
and utility (Sedayao et al., 2014). It also tackled Yang’s et al., (2013) findings, as the
quantity of quasi-identifiers grew, the data loss grew. To handle both obstacles, the
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fraction element of the algorithm ranked approaches by the lowest absolute difference of
falsification and suppression. Then to ensure adaptability, the data processor could set
preference to precision or original record and has the option to set a minimum precision
level. By setting this balance, the research minimized the data loss at different quantities
of quasi-identifiers. It also maintained privacy by using foundational k-anonymity and ldiversity methods, and it balanced the dataset’s utility.
Conclusion
This algorithm maintained the objective of any privacy model. It is effective by
publishing higher quantities of data without decreasing security (Aggarwal & Yu, 2008).
This research created an algorithm that has the capability of processing a dataset with
different quantities of quasi-identifiers. It has the ability to include a single sensitive
value and determine the influence it has on the overall dataset’s publication ability. The
algorithm recommends the appropriate fraction of k with the option to customize the
results with a set minimum precision percentage. It also provides the processor with a
precision range of the recommended xk-anonymity. Overall, this study created a more
versatile privacy model that can process datasets of different sizes and attributes.
Three components designed the end algorithm: finding the best fraction,
providing the precision range, and stating the maximum data loss. Figure 2 outlined the
algorithm’s process to collect and recommend the xk-anonymity model. The study
verified the reliability of the procedure by first predicting the recommendations displayed
in Table 15 and Table 16, and it highlighted the results in Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure
10. Equation 1 and Equation 2 stated the process to determine the precision range and
maximum data loss. These equations verified in Figure 3, Figure 4, Figure 5, and 9 and
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Table 17 validated their accuracy. Altogether, these three features created an adaptable
algorithm that accomplished the dissertation’s goal.
The limitations set in this research may bound the usability for all data criterions.
This study limited the number quasi-identifiers and sensitive values processed in a
dataset. Additionally, the k value constantly remained five. Based on the structure of the
algorithm, the research is confident in processing a dataset with quasi-identifiers larger
than five and the diversity value larger than four; however, it did not test these
assumptions. The confidence comes from the foundation of the way the algorithm
recommends the fraction, precision range, and maximum data loss. The fraction can
process datasets with and without a sensitive value. It reviews and recommends a fraction
from the balance of the absolute difference, precision, and original record count, unless
otherwise preferred. It also knows the highest precision value and maximum data loss
based on numerous tests of processing datasets with and without anonymization
techniques. The uncertainty comes when including more than one sensitive value. The
research did not test nor did it include a process to handle datasets with more than one
sensitive value. From the results, this study would recommend processing the datasets
with the recommended algorithm as many times as it has sensitive values, each time
processing the dataset with one of the sensitive values and its corresponding diversity
requirement. Even though the research set these limitations based on the adaptability of
the components in the algorithm, it is satisfied necessary modifications can easily be
included.
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Implications & Recommendations
When considering publishing datasets with personally identifying information,
this research provided a new set of considerations. This study impacted the field of the
privacy. Organizations have legal obligations to protect people’s information (Angiuli &
Waldo, 2016), but it also is necessary for organizations to publish research to improve
society (Armer, 1981). With these findings, data processors have more options to
consider when processing a dataset with privacy in mind. It showed each dataset is
unique, and to maximize the return value on the dataset’s information, it should balance
the falsification and suppression. This way society can grow, and people remain
protected.
Future research should dive more into the uniqueness of a dataset’s attributes. It
should study the ability of the algorithm to process datasets with more quasi-identifiers
and sensitive values. It also could change the k value to see the effects on the
recommended fractions. Finally, more research should consider an investigation on the
association of quasi-identifier pairs and the records linked to them. This core
development of knowledge can assist in growing the privacy field’s way of processing a
dataset.
Another area future studies should investigate is how to standardize the
anonymization utility measurement. This research measured the dataset’s utility using the
correlation matrix outlined in Table 18. The correlation matrixes demonstrated that
processing datasets with multiple different anonymization approaches and with
preferences influence the end attribute relationship. Future research should build a tool to
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assist in truly measuring the impact on quasi-identifiers and sensitive values, if
applicable, against the pre- and post-processed dataset.
Privacy processed datasets that include anonymization techniques affect precision
and change the relationship between its attributes (Angiuli & Waldo, 2016). This
research’s core goal was to aid in the development of processing diverse datasets. The
study investigated four aspects in processing a dataset. It found the amount of quasiidentifier pairs and records fulfilling the xk-anonymity criteria influenced the end
publishable quantity and the need to include anonymization techniques. It discovered
when including sensitive values without the use of sensitive suppression, the dataset had
a limitation of which xk-anonymity recommendations were eligible. The diversity of
quasi-identifiers impact the overall publication potential when it is under xk-anonymity.
Finally, the precision of a dataset has the potential of decreasing the lower the fraction
when the ratio of pairs do not meet xk-anonymity. Each dataset is exceptional and needs
to be uniquely processed.
Summary
Introduction
Chapter one presented the dissertation research. It explained how the completion
of the study could benefit society. The problem this study anticipated fixing was to create
an algorithm adaptable for diverse datasets. The introduction explained what questions
needed answering to accomplish the dissertation’s goal successfully. It also set
limitations and assumptions to guide the research boundaries. The conclusion of the
chapter outlined key study terms and acronyms used throughout the report.
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Review of Literature
Chapter two summarized past works on the research’s topic. It included a
narration of foundational anonymization models with additional proposed models to build
on privacy-preservation. This section also detailed different anonymization techniques
used to complete de-identification and the importance of attribute classification. It
provided insight on security weaknesses exposed by past models. Some models fixed
vulnerabilities presented in others’ models. Finally, this chapter illustrated the legal
obligations organizations have when processing datasets for anonymization. This review
of literature set the baseline on what the algorithm required and where it can grow.
Methodology
Chapter three outlined the study’s plan of action. It broke down each experiments’
process to address different aspects of the research. This section described how it
approached extracting the experiment and test datasets. It detailed the Java programs built
to assist in the process of the study. It also planned how to measure utility and precision
for this project. To close the chapter, the section graphed the progress of each phases’
completion date and what resources the research required to complete.
Result
Chapter four provided a complete summary of the experiment and algorithm
results. It analyzed all experiments and how it influenced the approach in designing the
adaptable algorithm. Afterwards, it answered each of the research questions. Based on the
answers and findings in the experiments, this section proposed the algorithm’s elements:
best fraction, precision range, and data loss. It then validated the algorithm by testing the
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experiment and test datasets. The chapter ended with the comparison of the pre- and postdataset correlation matrices for measuring utility.
Conclusion
Chapter five presented the final thoughts on the overall outcome of this study. It
recommended future directions for privacy-preservation research. In addition, it
illustrated key takeaways, including the uniqueness of each dataset, and the significance
of processing a dataset for anonymization depending on the best balance, set criteria, and
overall preference of the data processor. The final chapter summarized the entire
dissertation project and emphasized the prominence of data’s individuality.
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